Voice Cloning and Grandchild Scam: How to Recognize a Fake Call from a Loved One

The phone rings late at night. You hear crying and a familiar voice: "Grandma, I had an accident." After a moment, someone joins the conversation, introducing themselves as a police officer, saying that money needs to be sent quickly.

This scenario has been around for decades. One thing has changed: today, the voice can really sound like the grandchild's voice because it can be reproduced by computer software. The FBI warned about this in an official statement on December 3, 2024, and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) already did so in March 2023.

The good news is that defending yourself does not require knowledge of technology. It requires one habit: hang up and call back your own number. Below you will find how to do this in practice – on both the Polish and American sides.

What Classic “Grandchild” Scam Looks Like

The scheme is simple and repeatable. Someone calls claiming to be a family member – most often a grandchild or child, less frequently a spouse or parent. They say that something unfortunate has happened: an accident, arrest, serious trouble. Quick financial help is needed.

The conversation has three constant elements: strong emotions, urgency, and a request for discretion. The Polish Police have been describing this scheme for years, and in a statement from February 27, 2023, prepared with FinCERT.pl – the Banking Cybersecurity Center of ZBP, they indicate two variants: “grandchild” and “police officer.”

The victim has no chance to think. It is not a matter of intelligence or age, but of a script written to disable a cool assessment of the situation.

Variants: Police Officer, Prosecutor, Lawyer, Hospital

The “grandchild” is just the beginning. The most common extensions include:

• As a police officer. A “officer” joins the conversation, confirms the version, provides rank and case number.
• As a prosecutor. The same mechanics, higher authority: “proceedings,” “district prosecutor's office,” “secret operation.”
• As a lawyer. Someone supposedly represents a loved one and needs an advance to “settle the matter before night.”
• Fake call from the hospital. “Doctor” or “paramedic”: a loved one is in an accident, urgent payment for treatment or transport is required.
• Fake arrest. A loved one is supposedly already at the police station and “cannot talk.”
• Fake accident with a victim. A loved one supposedly hit someone and needs to pay the victim's family.

The same scheme can be used without a family thread – with a “bank employee” who instructs to “secure funds.” The police and FinCERT.pl describe this as a fake “technical account” or “secure”. If someone over the phone instructs you to transfer money to such an account, the conversation ends at that moment.

Bail – Why This Word Should Raise a Red Flag

Only in the USA: in the American system, bail (bail) really exists. It is set by the court and is paid to the court or jail or through a licensed intermediary (bail bondsman). No one from the court or police will collect bail from a courier at your home, nor accept it in gift cards or cryptocurrency.

Only in Poland: in Polish criminal proceedings, there is no “bail” that is paid over the phone to release someone that night. A property preventive measure is applied by the court or prosecutor by decision, and the money goes to deposit – never into the hands of the caller.

The conclusion is the same on both sides of the ocean: the word “bail” in an unsolicited phone call is a warning signal, not a procedure.

What Voice Cloning Changed

The FBI in the IC3 statement from December 3, 2024 (alert number I-120324-PSA) describes it directly: criminals “generate short audio recordings containing the voice of a loved one to impersonate a relative in a crisis situation and ask for immediate financial help or demand ransom.”

The FTC described the same back in March 2023: a scammer only needs “a short recording of a family member's voice, which can be obtained from content published online,” and a voice cloning program.

In the 2025 IC3 annual report, the FBI calls this phenomenon directly. Distress scams, or “grandchild” scams, in which “voice cloning technology is used to imitate the voice of a loved one in distress,” resulted in reported losses of over $5 million in 2025. The FBI adds that the scheme “is evolving towards imitating other family members or close friends.”

This number should be read cautiously, and the FBI presents it as such: it pertains to reports with likely AI involvement and includes only cases reported to IC3.

The source material does not have to come from a hack. Public content is sufficient: a TikTok video, an Instagram story, a YouTube video, a voice recording in a Facebook group. This is the same mechanism we describe in the guide about holiday photos in the hands of a scammer – only the raw material is voice instead of images.

The practical consequence is serious: voice recognition has ceased to be proof of identity. Throughout our lives, we have learned that if someone sounds like our child, it is our child. This principle has ceased to work.

How Much Recording Does a Scammer Need – and Why This Is Not the Right Question

In the media, the number “three seconds” circulates. Sometimes it’s “30 seconds” or “a minute.”

No specific number of seconds has been confirmed in the original source. The FBI writes about “short audio recordings,” the FTC about “a short recording of a voice.” None of these institutions provide a time threshold. The number “three seconds,” which can even be found under the FTC article, comes from a reader's comment, not from the office.

Why does this not change the recommendations? Because the time threshold has no operational significance. If someone in your family has ever published a recording of their voice, the material already exists. The dispute over three seconds or thirty does not affect the decision at the phone. The decision remains the same: hang up and call back.

As for the limitations of technology – it is also worth being cautious. The FBI advises to “carefully listen to the tone and choice of words” and check images and videos for imperfections, such as distorted hands and feet or unrealistic features.

Do not make a list of “how to recognize an artificial voice.” Detection methods are still being developed – the FTC announced the results of the Voice Cloning Challenge on April 8, 2024. Award-winning solutions include algorithms for detecting synthetic speech, watermarks in recordings, and authenticating the human origin of the voice. These are technological proposals, not something that an ordinary person has on their phone today.

Do not rely on your own ear. Rely on the procedure.

Deepfake Videos and Fake “Police Officer” on Video Calls

Video has ceased to be a guarantee. The Polish Police and FinCERT.pl ZBP warned on July 21, 2026, that criminals “use video calls to convincingly ‘embody’ another person during the conversation.”

The scheme: the scammer initiates a video call in a messenger, appears in uniform, refers to an ongoing investigation, and then switches the victim to another person impersonating a bank employee. Among the warning signals, the police mention “inconsistencies in information or strange behavior of the interlocutor (e.g., unnatural image, artificiality of the character).”

A uniform on the screen is not a credential.

Can anything be noticed? Sometimes yes. The FBI describes observable flaws in the 2025 IC3 report – although it does so using the example of fake job interviews, not family scams. According to the FBI, “the actions and lip movements of the person visible on the camera do not fully match the sound,” and “coughing, sneezing, or other sounds may be out of sync with what is visible on the screen.”

This is a hint, but not a test. The absence of such flaws does not prove that the interlocutor is real.

Number Spoofing and Hacked Accounts in Messengers

Spoofing is impersonating someone else's phone number. A familiar number appears on the display – a loved one’s, a command’s, or one differing by just one digit. CBZC reminds that you should not provide personal data or authorization codes and not initiate transfers under the influence of the caller's persuasion.

Only in Poland: spoofing and smishing are regulated by the Act of July 28, 2023, on combating abuses in electronic communication (Dz.U. 2023 poz. 1703). UKE has signed an agreement with operators: in case of detecting spoofing, the call should be rejected or established without displaying the number (“Unknown number”). This is a real change, but it does not relieve you of the obligation to verify.

Only in the USA: the FCC maintains pages on caller ID spoofing and unwanted calls. The principle is the same: the number on the display is not proof.

A separate issue is hacked accounts. If someone takes over your son’s WhatsApp, Messenger, or Facebook account, the message will come from his real account, with his photo and chat history. The most common way to take over is by phishing for a verification code: “I accidentally sent you a code, please send it back to me.” Do not send that code to anyone, ever.

Pressure Mechanics: Secrecy, Cash, Courier, Cards, Cryptocurrencies

Each element of the scenario has its function. Named, they cease to work.

Request for secrecy (“don’t tell your parents,” “this is a secret operation”) cuts the victim off from the only person who could ask a sober question. The police list “secret police operation” as a warning signal.

Time pressure blocks the instinct to check. There is no procedure that requires a financial decision in forty minutes and forbids consultation.

Cash and courier – because cash handed from hand to hand cannot be reversed or traced. The police have been describing this variant for years: perpetrators want “to have you hand over money through a mysterious courier, leaving it on the street or making a transfer.”

Gift cards – because the code from the card is cash that can be redeemed anonymously. No public institution accepts payments in gift cards.

Cryptocurrencies and instant transfers – because the funds disappear before anyone can react. The FTC states directly: cryptocurrency payments are usually irreversible.

Impersonating the police works because the uniform shuts down discussion.

How Police Really Contact You – Poland

Only in Poland. The Polish Police state this unequivocally. In the statement “Fraud ‘As a Police Officer’ – Be Careful,” it is stated that police officers “never demand that we hand over cash in any way” and that “they never involve us in their operations, do not ask about account status, and do not require making any transfers.” In an older statement, it is noted: “officers never inform us about ongoing investigations over the phone! They also never ask for money!”

What a real police officer or prosecutor will not do over the phone:

• will not ask for cash, a transfer, or to hand over money to a courier,
• will not ask about account status, login data, or SMS authorization codes,
• will not require keeping the conversation secret from family,
• will not propose participation in a “secret operation,”
• will not instruct you to transfer money to a “technical account” or “secure” account.

If you have doubts: hang up and call 112 or 997, or the command number you verified yourself – not the one given by the caller.

How Police Really Contact You – USA

Only in the USA. The rules are similar. No federal agency or local police will call demanding immediate payment via gift cards, cryptocurrency, Western Union, MoneyGram, or cash picked up by a courier.

The FTC even formulates it in relation to itself: the commission “will never threaten you, say that you must move money to ‘protect’ it, or instruct you to withdraw cash or buy gold and hand it to someone.” A lawyer is chosen independently, not accepted from someone who called first. In an emergency, you call 911.

Ten Examples of Scammer Conversations

All of the following conversations are illustrative examples. Names and situations are fictional.

Example 1 – classic “grandchild.” “Grandma, it’s me… I had an accident, I have a broken jaw, that’s why I’m talking strangely. Don’t tell mom. I need ten thousand by tonight.” “That’s why I’m talking strangely” is a ready explanation for any inconsistency in the voice.

Example 2 – victim providing a name. “Hi, guess who?” – “Tomek?” – “Yes, grandma, Tomek.” The scammer does not know the name. They get it from the victim.

Example 3 – transfer to “police officer.” “You are speaking with the sub-commissioner. Your grandson caused an accident. The matter needs to be settled, but you must act now and not inform anyone.”

Example 4 – prosecutor. “District prosecutor’s office. Your account is being used without your knowledge. Please do not hang up and do not contact anyone, as this may lead to charges of obstructing the investigation.”

Example 5 – lawyer. “I represent your son from the office. There is a chance for release today, but I need an advance before six. A courier will be here in half an hour.”

Example 6 – hospital. “I’m calling from the emergency room. Your daughter is in an accident and requires immediate surgery. The insurance does not cover transport.”

Example 7 – “secure account.” “I’m calling from the bank’s security department. Someone is trying to take a loan in your name. We need to transfer your savings to a technical account.”

Example 8 – video call with “officer.” On the screen, a person in uniform: “You see, I’m a real police officer. I will soon connect you with a bank employee who will confirm this.”

Example 9 – grandchild abroad. “Aunt, I’m in Chicago, I was stopped at the airport, they took my phone. Don’t call back this number, because it’s not mine.” The prohibition on calling back is one of the strongest warning signals.

Example 10 – second wave after loss. “I’m calling from the recovery team. We’ve tracked your money. To initiate the return, a processing fee is required.” Victims may be attacked a second time by the same people.

Five Examples of Fake Messages

All of the following messages are illustrative examples.

Example A. “Mom, I lost my phone, this is my new number. Write on WhatsApp, I have an urgent matter.”

Example B. “Dad, I can’t talk right now, I’m at the police station. I need a transfer, I’ll pay you back on Friday. Don’t call, just text.”

Example C. “I accidentally sent you an SMS code. Please send it back to me, it’s about my account.” – classic account takeover in a messenger.

Example D. “Law office. A payment is required for your grandson before 6 PM. Details at the link.” – the link leads to a fake payment page.

Example E. “Notification of package detention for P. [surname]. An additional payment of 3.50 PLN is required.” – another scenario, but often precedes a call: it serves to determine who reacts to messages.

Common features: new number, prohibition on calling back, request for code, link, amount, and deadline.

Table: What the Scammer Says, What to Do

What the Scammer Says	What to Do
“Grandma, it’s me, I had an accident”	Do not provide a name. Say “I’ll call back” and hang up.
“Don’t tell your parents”	Call your parents immediately. Secrecy is part of the scam.
“Don’t hang up, it’s important”	Hang up. That’s the only thing the scammer wants to block.
“I’m calling from the police, we’re handling a case”	Hang up and call 112 or 997 (USA: 911) or the command from your own book.
“You need to pay bail today”	Bail is not set over the phone. Verify with the source.
“A courier will come for the money”	Do not open the door. No institution collects cash via courier.
“Please transfer funds to a technical account”	Hang up. Call the bank hotline from the back of your card.
“Please buy gift cards”	This is always a scam. Without exceptions.
“Send me the SMS code”	Never send the code. Not even to a friend.
“This is my friend’s number, don’t call back”	Call the number you have saved.
“We’re from the money recovery team”	Report this as another scam. No one recovers money for an upfront fee.

How to Verify the Caller

One rule to remember forever:

Hang up. Call back yourself. To the number you have saved.

The FBI states this identically: verify the identity of the caller by hanging up, establishing contact yourself, and calling that number directly. The FTC adds: do not trust the voice, call the person who supposedly contacted you using a number you know is theirs. If you cannot get through – try through another family member or friends.

Some practical notes:

• Do not call back using the “call back” button. Select the contact from your phone book or enter the number manually.
• Hang up completely and wait a moment.
• Do not check the number in a search engine. Fake hotlines can be advertised in the results.
• If a loved one does not answer, it is not confirmation of the story. Call someone else.

Verification questions that work: those to which the answer does not exist online – a shared, unpublished memory: what did we eat at the last dinner, what broke in the car.

Questions that do not work: mother’s name, maiden name, dog’s name, date of birth, street. All of this is on social media or in data leaks. Worse, by asking such a question, you provide the scammer with what to answer.

Why voice recognition is no longer enough: because a voice can be reproduced from a public recording, and crying, background noise, and “broken jaw” are in the script to mask imperfections.

Family Security Password

The FBI recommends this directly: “Establish a secret word or phrase with your family to verify identity.”

Construction rules:

1. It cannot come from your biography. No names, dates, places, animals, favorite teams.
2. It cannot appear anywhere online – neither in posts, comments, nor chats.
3. It should be easy to pronounce under stress: two or three ordinary words.
4. It should be absurd, not logical. An association that no one will guess because it makes no sense.
5. Establish it face to face. Never via SMS, email, or messenger, and do not write it down on your phone.
6. Establish a response, not just a password. One person says the password, the other responds with the agreed word.
7. Change it if it was mentioned in front of strangers or in a conversation with a scammer.
8. Absolute rule: no password means the end of the conversation. Even if the voice sounds familiar. Especially then.

We consciously do not provide an example password. A password printed in a guide ceases to be a password.

Family Response Plan

The plan only makes sense if established before the phone rings.

1. Designate a contact person – one person to always call with a suspicious phone call, plus a backup person.
2. Establish a family password according to the rules above.
3. Agree on a zero rule. No one in the family ever asks for money over the phone without confirmation through another channel.
4. Write down numbers on a piece of paper next to the phone: children, grandchildren, bank, command, 112 or 911.
5. Agree on no consequences. If someone has been deceived, the family reacts with help, not judgment.
6. Practice it once. One trial call where the senior says “I’ll call back” and hangs up is worth more than ten conversations about threats.
7. Return to the topic in six months. Scenarios change.

Phone and Account Configuration

Below are only features confirmed in the official documentation of manufacturers. Names in the interface may vary between system versions.

iPhone (iOS 26). In the Phone app settings, there is an option Classify Unknown Callers with options Never, Ask for the reason for the call, and Silence. Call Filtering (Unknown Callers, Spam) works separately. In FaceTime, there is a separate setting Silence Unknowns. A number can be blocked individually (Block Contact). Apple notes that call classification turns off 24 hours after calling an emergency number and does not work in roaming.

Android (Google Phone app). Available are Caller ID and spam protection and Block Phone Number. The Call Screening feature works only on Pixel phones and in selected countries – Poland is not on Google’s list.

Operators. Only in the USA: you can enter a number into the National Do Not Call Registry (donotcall.gov). This limits legal telemarketing but does not stop scammers. Only in Poland: operators are required to filter SMS according to CSIRT NASK patterns and combat spoofing under the 2023 Act.

WhatsApp. Enable two-step verification (PIN) – protects against someone taking over your number by phishing for an SMS code. There is also a function to mute calls from unknown people. Instructions are in the WhatsApp Help Center.

Facebook and Messenger. Enable two-factor authentication. If the account has been hacked, the starting point is facebook.com/hacked.

Limiting Source Material. The FBI advises: limit the publication of content featuring your image and voice, set social media accounts to private, and limit the follower list to people you know.

How to Talk to a Senior Without Embarrassing Them

This is the hardest part and often overlooked. A few things that help:

Do not start with a warning, start with a request for help. “Mom, let’s establish a password because I’m afraid someone will impersonate me” works better than “you need to be careful because you’ll be scammed.” In the first version, the senior is a partner, in the second – a problem.

Do not say “because you don’t understand technology.” Voice cloning deceives people of all ages.

Do not test the parent without warning. A staged “test call” is humiliation, not training.

Instead of a lecture – one sentence. “If someone calls asking for money, hang up and call me.”

Say directly that you will never call for money. “If you hear my voice and a request for a transfer, it’s not me.”

Remove the shame upfront. “If this happens to you, just call me. I won’t judge.” Victims who fear family reactions report losses too late or not at all. If a senior has already lost money, do not start with “how could you” – start with the bank.

Printable Instructions to Keep by the Phone

IF SOMEONE CALLS ASKING FOR MONEY

1. DO NOT PROVIDE A NAME. Let the caller introduce themselves.

2. SAY: “I’LL CALL BACK” AND HANG UP. You are always allowed to hang up.

3. CALL YOURSELF to the number saved in your phone. Not the one that called you.

4. ASK FOR THE FAMILY PASSWORD. No password = end of conversation.

5. NEVER GIVE: cash to a courier, SMS codes, gift cards, bank details.

6. THE POLICE NEVER asks for money over the phone.

7. CALL SOMEONE FROM YOUR FAMILY. Always, even at night.

IN CASE OF DOUBT: 112 (Poland) / 911 (USA)

Numbers of loved ones: ................................................

What to Do Immediately After Losing Money

Order matters. The first hour counts the most.

1. Call the bank. Report the fraudulent transaction and ask for an attempt to stop the transfer. Call the number from the back of your card or from the bank's official website.

2. Report to the police. Only in Poland: a report is made at the nearest police station or prosecutor's office. Only in the USA: notify local police and file a report with IC3.

3. If you handed cash to a courier: call 112 or 997 (USA: 911) immediately. Note the time, appearance of the person, make and color of the car, direction of departure. If there is monitoring in the building, ask the administration to secure the recording the same day.

4. If you bought gift cards: Only in the USA: the FTC advises contacting the card issuer, stating that it was used in a scam, and requesting a refund. Keep the card and receipt. Sometimes the funds have not yet been withdrawn.

5. If you made a transfer through a money transfer company: Only in the USA: the FTC provides contacts for reporting fraudulent transfers: MoneyGram 1-800-926-9400, Western Union 1-800-448-1492, Ria (transfers outside Walmart) 1-877-443-1399, Ria (Walmart2Walmart and Walmart2World) 1-855-355-2144.

6. If you sent cash by mail: Only in the USA: the FTC provides the number for the U.S. Postal Inspection Service 877-876-2455 and advises requesting interception of the package.

7. If you sent cryptocurrency: report the transaction to the company through which you sent it. The FTC notes that cryptocurrency payments are usually irreversible.

8. If you provided login details: change your password immediately, and if you use it elsewhere – there too. Enable two-factor authentication.

9. If you provided personal data. Only in the USA: if you disclosed your SSN, go to identitytheft.gov. Only in Poland: consider blocking your PESEL number on gov.pl or in the mObywatel app.

10. Secure evidence. Take screenshots of calls and messages, note numbers, times, amounts, account numbers, transfer confirmations, receipts, cryptocurrency wallet addresses. Write down your account of the conversation while the details are fresh in your memory. Do not delete SMS or chat history.

11. Alert family and friends. If an account in a messenger has been taken over, the same story goes to all contacts.

12. Expect a second attack. An offer to “recover money for a fee” is another scam.

Honest warning: reporting does not mean that the money will be returned. The bank is not obliged to return funds transferred knowingly by a client under the influence of a scammer, and regulations and practices differ between Poland and the USA and among institutions. Nevertheless, report it – without a report, the chances drop to zero.

Most Common Mistakes

• Providing a name at the beginning of the conversation. “Tomek, is that you?” gives the scammer your entire identity.
• Calling back using the “call back” button. It’s the same number they spoofed.
• Treating a known number or video image as proof. Both can be faked.
• Giving in to the request for secrecy. Secrecy is a condition for the scammer's success.
• Sending the SMS code to a friend. Even if the account is real, it was taken over that way.
• Delaying notifying the bank out of shame. Every hour reduces chances.
• Having a one-time conversation with family. Without repetition and without an established password, it is not a plan.

Myths and Facts

Myth: since I hear their voice, it must be them. Fact: the FBI and FTC describe generating short recordings of a loved one’s voice based on materials from the internet. Voice is no longer proof of identity.

Myth: the display shows my daughter’s number, so it’s her. Fact: spoofing allows any number to be displayed. CBZC describes this phenomenon directly.

Myth: this only concerns older people. Fact: the scheme is based on fear for loved ones, not on age or lack of knowledge.

Myth: I will recognize an artificial voice by its robotic sound. Fact: the FBI advises paying attention to tone and word choice, but does not provide a certain method of recognition.

Myth: it’s enough not to answer unknown numbers. Fact: it helps, but the call can come from a hacked account of a friend or a spoofed family number.

Myth: the bank can transfer money to a “technical account” for safety. Fact: The police and FinCERT.pl ZBP state unequivocally that the bank never asks for this.

Myth: “three seconds of recording is enough” – that’s a technical fact. Fact: this number has not been confirmed in the original source. Institutions write about “short recordings,” without providing a threshold. Recommendations remain the same regardless of the number of seconds.

Where to Report Fraud or Incident

Only in Poland:

• 112 – emergency number. 997 – Police. Both are operational.
• Report a crime – nearest police station or prosecutor's office.
• Suspicious SMS – send it to 8080 to CERT Polska. Reporting is free (outside Poland, costs according to the operator's tariff). Provide the entire message in its original form, without cutting the link. A maximum of 3 messages can be reported from one number within 4 hours.
• Internet incident – form at incydent.cert.pl.
• CBZC – accepts information useful in combating cybercrime: kontakt.cbzc@cbzc.policja.gov.pl, 24/7 Service Department 47 72 136 99. This does not replace reporting a crime.
• Bank – hotline from the back of your card or from the bank's official website.
• Block your PESEL number – gov.pl or mObywatel app.

Only in the USA:

• 911 – in an emergency. Otherwise, local police station.
• FBI IC3 – report via complaint.ic3.gov.
• FTC – ReportFraud.ftc.gov.
• Identity Theft – IdentityTheft.gov.
• AARP Fraud Watch Network Helpline – 877-908-3360, Monday to Friday, 8:00 AM–8:00 PM Eastern Time.
• Bank, card issuer, money transfer company – immediately, contacts as above.

Key Principles

1. Hang up and call back to the number you have saved. This one rule stops most of these scams by itself.
2. Voice is not proof of identity. Video is not either.
3. The number on the display is not proof of identity.
4. Do not provide a name to the caller. Let them introduce themselves.
5. The police and banks never ask for money, codes, or transfers to a “secure account.”
6. A request for secrecy from family is a warning signal, not a procedure.
7. Gift cards, cryptocurrency, cash for a courier – no institution is paid in these forms.
8. Establish a password with your family and a rule: no password means the end of the conversation.
9. Limit public recordings of your voice and your children’s.
10. Act immediately and without shame after a loss. First the bank, then the police.

Checklist

• We have established a family security password (face to face, not via SMS)
• We have established a response to the password
• We have designated a contact person and a backup person
• I told my parents and grandparents: “I will never ask you for money over the phone”
• A printed instruction sheet is next to the senior's phone
• Numbers of loved ones are saved in the senior's phone under readable names
• The bank hotline number is saved separately
• Spam protection and caller identification are enabled on the phone
• WhatsApp: two-step verification (PIN) is enabled
• Facebook and Messenger: two-factor authentication is enabled
• Family social media accounts are private
• We reviewed public videos featuring the voices of children and grandchildren
• We practiced once the conversation: “I’ll call back” and hung up
• Only in the USA: the number is in the donotcall.gov registry
• Only in Poland: I know that suspicious SMS should be sent to 8080
• We agreed that after a loss, no one judges anyone

Frequently Asked Questions

Can my grandchild's voice really be faked?

Yes. The FBI and FTC describe this as a real, used method. Source material can be content published online.

How much recording does a scammer need?

No specific number of seconds has been confirmed in the original source. Institutions write about “short recordings.” For your decision at the phone, it does not matter – you still need to call back.

Will I recognize that the voice is artificial by its sound?

Do not count on it. The FBI advises paying attention to tone and word choice, but does not provide a certain method.

The number on the display was my daughter’s number. How is that possible?

This is spoofing. The number can be faked. In Poland, the 2023 Act imposes an obligation on operators to combat this phenomenon, but effectiveness is not one hundred percent.

Can the police ask for money to be transferred?

No. The Polish Police state that officers “never demand that we hand over cash in any way.” It is the same in the USA.

A loved one calls from a new number and says they lost their phone. What to do?

Call the old number. Call another family member. Ask for the password. Do not send money to the new number.

A friend asks for me to send back an SMS code. Is it safe?

No. This is how accounts in messengers are taken over. The code should never be sent to anyone.

Will the bank refund my money?

There is no guarantee, especially if the transfer was initiated voluntarily under the influence of a scammer. Report the matter immediately, but do not assume a refund.

Is it worth reporting since I probably won’t get my money back?

Yes. Reporting can help stop the transfer, initiate proceedings, and contribute to statistics on which laws and protections are changed.

I received a call offering to recover lost money. Is this help?

No. This is another scam, often directed at people who have already lost once.

Should I delete all recordings from the internet?

You do not have to, but it is worth limiting public access. The FBI recommends setting accounts to private and limiting the follower list to known individuals.

Does this only concern phones?

No. The same scenario appears on WhatsApp, Messenger, and in video calls.

Sources

Access date for all sources: 2026-07-26.

1. FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) – “Criminals Use Generative Artificial Intelligence to Facilitate Financial Fraud” (Alert Number I-120324-PSA, December 3, 2024) – https://www.ic3.gov/PSA/2024/PSA241203 – FBI warning about the use of generative AI for financial fraud, including voice cloning of loved ones, with a recommendation to establish a family password and call back to a self-established number.
2. FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) – “2025 IC3 Annual Report” (66 pages, chapter on AI, pp. 40–41) – https://www.ic3.gov/AnnualReport/Reports/2025_IC3Report.pdf – FBI annual report: losses of over $5 million reported in 2025 in distress scams (“grandchild”) using voice cloning and description of observable flaws in deepfake videos (discrepancy between lip movement and sound).
3. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) – “Scammers use AI to enhance their family emergency schemes” (March 20, 2023, Alvaro Puig) – https://consumer.ftc.gov/consumer-alerts/2023/03/scammers-use-ai-enhance-their-family-emergency-schemes – description of the “grandchild” scam using voice cloning and verification instructions by calling back to a known number.
4. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) – “Fighting back against harmful voice cloning” (April 8, 2024) – https://consumer.ftc.gov/consumer-alerts/2024/04/fighting-back-against-harmful-voice-cloning – summary of FTC actions against voice cloning and reiteration of the rule to call back to a known number.
5. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) – “FTC Announces Winners of Voice Cloning Challenge” (April 8, 2024) – https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/04/ftc-announces-winners-voice-cloning-challenge – description of award-winning solutions for detecting and watermarking synthetic speech.
6. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) – “What To Do if You Were Scammed” – https://consumer.ftc.gov/articles/what-do-if-you-were-scammed – steps after losing money according to payment form, with contact numbers for money transfer companies and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.
7. FBI IC3 – reporting form – https://complaint.ic3.gov/ – official form for reporting internet crime in the USA.
8. FTC – https://reportfraud.ftc.gov/ – official channel for reporting fraud to the FTC.
9. FTC – https://www.identitytheft.gov/ – U.S. government service with an action plan after identity theft.
10. FTC / FCC – National Do Not Call Registry – https://www.donotcall.gov/ – registry of numbers excluded from telemarketing in the USA.
11. AARP – “Report Fraud to the AARP Fraud Watch Network Helpline” – https://www.aarp.org/money/scams-fraud/helpline/ – free hotline 877-908-3360, open Monday to Friday from 8:00 AM to 8:00 PM Eastern Time.
12. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) – “Caller ID Spoofing” – https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/spoofing – explanation of phone number spoofing in the USA and legal principles.
13. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) – “Stop Unwanted Robocalls and Texts” – https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/stop-unwanted-robocalls-and-texts – FCC guide on unwanted calls and messages.
14. Police (KGP, Bureau for Combating Economic Crime) and FinCERT.pl – BCC ZBP – “The Fraud You See. Beware of Video Calls” (July 21, 2026) – https://policja.pl/pol/aktualnosci/279646,Oszustwo-ktore-widzisz-Uwazaj-na-wideorozmowy.html – warning about impersonating a police officer and bank employee during video calls and about fake “technical accounts.”
15. Police and FinCERT.pl ZBP – “Beware of ‘Grandchild’ Scams” (February 27, 2023) – https://policja.pl/pol/aktualnosci/228621,Uwazaj-na-oszustwa-na-wnuczka.html – step-by-step description of the “grandchild” and “police officer” variants.
16. Police – “Fraud ‘As a Police Officer’ – Be Careful” (May 13, 2022, archival material) – https://policja.pl/pol/aktualnosci/218064,Oszustwo-quotNa-policjantaquot-badzmy-ostrozni.html – unequivocal statement that police officers never demand cash or transfers.
17. Central Bureau for Combating Cybercrime (CBZC) – “Spoofing, or Impersonating Another Phone Number. How to Defend Yourself” – https://cbzc.policja.gov.pl/bzc/aktualnosci/242,Spoofing-czyli-podszywanie-sie-pod-inny-numer-telefonu-Jak-sie-bronic.html – explanation of spoofing and principles of data and authorization code protection.
18. CBZC – contact details – https://cbzc.policja.gov.pl/bzc/kontakt/cbzc/37,Centralne-Biuro-Zwalczania-Cyberprzestepczosci.html – address, email box contact.cbzc@cbzc.policja.gov.pl and the 24/7 Service Department number 47 72 136 99.
19. CERT Polska / NASK, gov.pl service – “Did you receive a disturbing SMS or email? Report it to CERT Polska (CSIRT NASK)” – https://www.gov.pl/web/baza-wiedzy/dostales-niepokojacy-sms-albo-email-zglos-go-do-cert-polska-csirt-nask – confirmation that the number 8080 has been operational since November 22, 2023, and that sending an SMS is free in Poland.
20. CERT Polska – contact and reporting channels – https://cert.pl/kontakt/ – form, email address, SMS number 8080, and ePUAP.
21. CERT Polska – incident reporting – https://incydent.cert.pl/ – official form for reporting security incidents.
22. Journal of Laws – Act of July 28, 2023, on combating abuses in electronic communication (Dz.U. 2023 poz. 1703) – https://dziennikustaw.gov.pl/DU/2023/1703 – legal basis for combating spoofing and smishing in Poland.
23. Office of Electronic Communications (UKE) – “Operators will implement effective solutions to combat phone number spoofing. We have signed an agreement” – https://uke.gov.pl/blog/operatorzy-wdroza-skuteczne-rozwiazania-przeciwdzialajace-podszywaniu-sie-pod-numery-telefonow-podpisalismy-porozumienie,109.html – description of the mechanism for blocking spoofing and filtering SMS by operators.
24. gov.pl – “Other emergency numbers” – https://www.gov.pl/web/numer-alarmowy-112/inne-numery-alarmowe – confirmation that 112 and 997 are current emergency numbers.
25. gov.pl – “Block your PESEL number or reverse the blocking” – https://www.gov.pl/web/gov/zastrzez-swoj-numer-pesel-lub-cofnij-zastrzezenie – official e-service for blocking PESEL number.
26. Apple – “Managing Unknown Callers on iPhone” – https://support.apple.com/pl-pl/111106 – description of the Classify Unknown Callers, Call Filtering, and Silence Unknowns in FaceTime (iOS 26) features.
27. Apple – “Blocking phone numbers, contacts, and email addresses on iPhone or iPad” – https://support.apple.com/pl-pl/111104 – instructions for blocking numbers and a list of blocked contacts.
28. Google – “Using Caller ID and spam protection” – https://support.google.com/phoneapp/answer/3459196?hl=pl – official instructions for enabling spam protection in the Phone app.
29. Google – “Blocking and unblocking a phone number” – https://support.google.com/phoneapp/answer/6325463?hl=pl – official instructions for blocking numbers on Android.
30. WhatsApp – “How to manage two-step verification settings?” – https://faq.whatsapp.com/1920866721452534 – official instructions for enabling two-step verification PIN.
31. Meta / Facebook – “How does two-factor authentication work on Facebook?” – https://www.facebook.com/help/148233965247823 – official description of two-factor authentication.
32. Meta / Facebook – recovering a hacked account – https://www.facebook.com/hacked – official starting point for the account recovery procedure.